Abstract This article analyzes how mandatory accounting disclosure is grounded on different rationales for private and public companies. It also explores technological changes, such as computerised databases and the Internet, which have recently made disclosure of company accounts by small companies potentially less costly and more valuable, thanks to electronic filing and universal online access to credit information systems. These recent developments favour policies that would expand the scope of mandatory publication for small companies in countries where it is voluntary. They also encourage policies to reduce the costs and enhance the value of disclosure through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems. Survey and registry evidence on how the information in the accounts is valued and used by companies is consistent with these claims about the evolution of the tradeoff of costs and benefits that should guide policy in this area.
In contrast, in the European Union all companies are required to file their accounts with a public registry. Most other countries also require many of their private companies to publicly file their accounts (UNCTAD 2005: 92) .
Discussions of these disclosure and publication requirements have led to disparate recommendations to slightly expand publication requirements [as in the UK (CLRSG 2000; DTI 2005) ], maintain them [as in Hong Kong (SCCLR 2000) and Malaysia (CLRC 2007) ] and reduce them [as in Australia (PJSCCS 2001) , Singapore (CLRFC 2002) ]. More recently, as part of its initiative to simplify the business environment and lessen administrative burdens, the Commission of the European Communities (2007, 2009a ) also proposed to exempt small companies so that they would not necessarily be required by national law to publish their accounts. 1 Mandatory publication of accounts by private companies relates to several strands of the economic, accounting and financial literatures: deregulation of business formalities, mandatory financial disclosure, and investors' protection and credit information. Findings in all these areas thus provide complementary insights on the issue under discussion.
The European Commission aims to improve the environment of businesses by simplifying business formalities, a popular policy since the European Charter for Small Enterprises (2000) and the efforts of the World Bank through the ''Doing Business '' project (2003-2009) . This origin of the initiative explains the focus of the Commission on reducing costs practically without considering benefits.
2 As we will see, however, mandatory publication of accounts is not only an issue of reducing the costs of operating businesses but also of easing businesses' access to credit. The discussion therefore fits in with the argument given by Arruñada (2007 Arruñada ( , 2009 ) that simplification policies that narrowly focus on reducing the cost of institutional arrangements are counterproductive when they disregard the value of the services being provided.
Furthermore, in the case at hand, other strands of the accounting and finance literatures provide complementary perspectives for understanding the costs and benefits involved. Since the 1960s, there has been substantial controversy on the 1 The Commission of the European Communities (2009a) has finally proposed to define a category of small companies or ''micro entities'' that would be exempt from the accounting directives. This category of potentially exempted firms would cover companies which on their balance sheet dates do not exceed the limits of two of the three following criteria: 500,000 € in assets, 1,000,000 € in net turnover and an average of 10 employees in the financial year. In addition, the Commission (2007) had initially suggested relieving from publication requirements all ''small'' companies-that is, those meeting at least two of the following three criteria: less than 50 employees, less than 4.4 m € in assets and less than 8.8 m € in turnover. The Commission had also proposed treating medium-sized companies without a ''particular external user'' as small companies. A company would be considered medium-sized if it meets at least two of the following three criteria: less than 250 employees, assets lower than 17.5 m € and turnover lower than 35 m €. The number of companies potentially exempted would be between 88 and 97% in different EU countries, according to the European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Data Offices (ECCBSO 2007: 3) . 2 According to the Commission, publishing the accounts constitutes a major administrative burden but is inconsequential if-when given freedom to disclose or not-small firms choose not to disclose because their accounts are only ''used by a limited number of stakeholders, such as credit institutions and suppliers that have the possibility to require financial information directly from the company'' (Commission of the European Communities 2007: 17).
balance of costs and benefits and the optimal content of mandatory financial disclosure. In the current regulatory framework of the USA, 3 however, most of these discussions have focused on mandatory disclosure by public companies-that is, companies selling shares or bonds to individual investors in stock exchanges. These public companies are required by law to not only file financial information publicly on a periodic basis but also to disclose other information on the company, provide detailed data on new issues of securities and report any trade by insiders.
Even though most of our discussion will refer to the mandatory publication of annual accounts by small private companies, part of the discussion on mandatory disclosure by public companies is applicable. Other parts of the analysis are substantially different, however, because of differences in the governance structure, size and availability of information of both types of companies, as well as differences in the contents of the information being mandatorily disclosed. In particular, previous research has focused on how mandatory disclosure for public companies affects the value of their equity by facilitating or not transactions on such equity. But the main interest for private companies lies in knowing how publishing their accounts could help their trading parties (mainly banks and suppliers) estimate their credit risk, thus expanding their access to credit and lowering its cost. The main effect should be to reduce information asymmetry in credit (including trade credit) transactions instead of in equity transactions.
In addition, given that the shares of public companies are traded in the stock market, it is possible to estimate the impact of mandatory disclosure on the value of the public companies. However, even if the reduction in the transaction costs of credit caused by mandatory publication of accounts also increases firm value, we cannot measure this effect because we lack market prices for equity shares in private companies. Therefore, without a comprehensive metric for evaluating the impact of mandatory publication of accounts, we can only aspire to building an enlightened qualitative inventory of costs and benefits. This difference, however, might be less substantial than it seems, as important disagreements remain amongst those measuring the effects of mandatory disclosure for public companies, 4 to the extent 3 In the USA, Japan and some other countries most private companies, whatever their size, are not obliged to disclose financial information. However, ''in most countries, many or even all entities are required by national law or regulation to prepare financial statements that conform to a required set of generally accepted accounting principles, and for these financial statements to be audited in accordance with a required set of generally accepted auditing standards. These audited financial statements are normally filed with a government agency and thus are available to creditors, suppliers, employees, governments, and others'' (UNCTAD 2005: 92) . 4 After more than four decades of empirical studies, evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure is mixed. The main studies that avoid confounding the effect of introducing the mandatory disclosure rule with unobserved shocks experienced by all companies' shares are the following. Chow (1983) finds a negative effect on value in a small sample of companies after the 1933 Securities Act. Simon (1989) observes a significant decrease in risk (as measured by the dispersion of abnormal returns) for new issues after the 1933 Act. Bushee and Leuz (2005) find many smaller firms delisting and value increases for firms previously disclosing and those which started disclosing after disclosure requirements were extended in 1999 to small companies trading in the over-the-counter market. Greenstone et al. (2006) find a substantial increase in value for companies affected by the 1964 Amendments that extended disclosure requirements to large firms trading over-the-counter.
that opinions on mandatory disclosure end up being a matter of qualitative judgement.
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Finally, mandatory financial disclosure may play a key role in economic growth, as it is an important element of the legal system intended to protect firms' transactions with investors and creditors. Protecting such transactions plays a crucial role in the development of modern financial markets, 6 and financial development is an important factor of economic growth.
7 Most studies focus on public companies trading in the stock market but similar claims can be made about private companies, mainly considering the evidence on the cost of credit. 8 The volume of credit contracted in an economy depends on two factors: information available on debtors' quality, 9 and the rights that the legal system grants to creditors in case of default.
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For the availability of information, the factor on which we are most interested, empirical evidence shows that the volume of credit grows when banks share more information on debtors and when the quality of credit registries improves. 11 It seems that the better the creditors know the quality and record of potential debtors, the lower the transaction costs of credit, probably because of both improved debtors' incentives and easier avoidance of adverse selection. As we will see, the main reason for the publication of accounts is that it allows improved assessment of credit risk for both individual transactions and bank and macroeconomic regulation.
This article analyses the publication of company accounts and argues that information technologies are reducing its costs and increasing its benefits, providing greater justification for mandatory publication of accounts. In addition to throwing light on the policy discussion on the regulation of accounting disclosure by private companies, the article offers three main contributions. First, it demonstrates that deregulation policies that focus too narrowly on reducing the cost of regulation may be counterproductive because they disregard the value of the services being provided by such regulation. Second, it complements the literature on mandatory financial disclosure by focusing on private companies, whereas previous studies have mainly focused on public companies. Third, it confirms that the main benefit of disclosure by private companies is that it facilitates credit transactions. Finally, the 5 For opposing views on empirical evidence and policy, see Easterbrook and Fischel (1984) , Coffee (1984) , Romano (1998 ), Choi (2000 , Healy and Palepu (2001), and Zingales (2004) . 6 So-called ''investor protection''-in fact, transaction protection, as rational investors cease transacting when foreseeing they will not be paid back-has been claimed to facilitate dispersed share ownership, large equity markets and entrepreneurs' access to capital (La Porta et al. 1999 , 1997 . 7 Rajan and Castro et al. (2004) . 8 Hansmann et al. also conjecture that creditor protection-including mandatory publication of financial statements by private companies-may be a precondition for contractual freedom among investors (2005: 5) . Whatever the overall merits of their argument, its application to mandatory publication of financial statements is flawed to the extent that publication was introduced in continental Europe long after such flexible forms were developed (the relevant EU directives date from 1968 to 1978) and even most German companies do not comply with the rule (Weilbach 1991) . 9 Mainly Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) .
article provides empirical evidence supporting such beneficial effects on credit transactions.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyses the costs of having private companies make their accounts public, distinguishing direct administrative costs, possible distortions in competition and the erosion of privacy. It concludes that account publication is not prohibitively costly and that administrative costs can and should be reduced further. Some other costs, such as damage to competition and privacy are doubtful, especially for micro and small companies. Section 3 maps the appropriable benefits of having private companies making their accounts public. It focuses on why publication improves on asking for and delivering accounts for individual transactions, and shows that most demand for company accounts is for those of small companies. Section 4 examines the externalities of account publication, paying special attention to those in credit assessment and bank regulation. It shows the essential function that published company accounts now play in the functioning of credit information systems; the role of these systems in reducing the cost of credit; and the damage that would be caused by a reduction in account publication, as it would not only reduce coverage but also the accuracy of all credit risk assessments. Section 5 discusses why firms might lack proper incentives to publish as they do not appropriate all the benefits, due to information asymmetries, externalities that would not be overcome by private arrangements, and the survival of inefficient social norms on privacy. It also examines the role of governments in structuring company registries in such a way as to achieve a more efficient trade-off of costs and benefits and how account publication may influence cross-border trade through its impact on the cost of credit. Section 6 concludes.
Mapping costs
Publishing company accounts involves substantial private costs. These include the direct administrative cost of preparing and filing the accounts. There may be other less direct costs, as publication may cause a competitive disadvantage for the disclosing firms, which may damage their incentives to invest. A third type of private cost is the loss of personal privacy.
Administrative costs
These costs are not trivial, as revealed by the lack of compliance observed when enforcement is lenient, as in Germany (Weilbach 1991: 800) or The Netherlands (Bollen 1996) . It has been argued that to avoid the costs of mandatory publication some firms are willing to do substantial restructuring (Barry 2006) , and publication avoidance has played a role in some massive changes in organisational form (Maijoor 1996) . Furthermore, mandatory disclosure may also interfere in the optimal choice of safeguarding instruments .
But the size of these costs is open to question, at least for most firms. First, the direct cost of compliance is small. The cost of preparing the annual accounts is low as the public accounts are now a standard by-product of any accounting software, which is in any case indispensable for managerial and tax accounting. Accounting software packages simply reorganize the data and automatically prepare different sets of accounts which follow the different formats required for managerial purposes, tax compliance and, when so required, public filing. A main reason why this holds even for micro companies is that the complexity of tax compliance leads entrepreneurs to purchase all these bureaucratic services, therefore benefiting from specialization advantages and scale economies.
12 Furthermore, the cost of filing the accounts can and should be minimised by extending the use of new technologies (electronic filing 13 ), extending the use of simplified accounts and eliminating useless procedures (such as notarising the signature of the company representative). In general, given that company accounts are not subject to any substantive review by the registry, it is relatively easy to automate the process.
14 Publishing financial accounts also incurs additional costs for administering and regulating the disclosure, as well as for filing and processing the information. To the extent that these services are financed by the filing firms, most of these costs are the same as those analysed in the previous paragraph. However, examining their structure is worthwhile because it suggests that even a substantial drop in account publication might reduce costs little for two reasons. First, investments by public registries, to make account filing possible and to manage the information flow, and by private firms, to capture and exploit the information, are mostly sunk costs and therefore irrelevant in the short run. Second, because both filing and exploiting the files offer substantial economies of scale. Therefore, many costs would be incurred anyway to serve the nonexempted firms and those which voluntarily decide to continue filing their accounts.
Lastly, part of the cost savings obtained by not filing the accounts would disappear, as all firms would be repeatedly required to provide more specific information to different agents. Such demanders of information would not only be their several banks and suppliers (this demand could be satisfied by voluntarily disclosing), but also public agencies which would stop relying on the public record of accounts (if this became substantially less complete) and would start building additional databases as well as enlarging their current demand of information from firms. 15 Of course, national governments could avoid this new demand for information by implementing mandatory disclosure. However, as explained in 12 The impact assessment by the Commission of the European Communities (2009b: 19) considers that the cost of publishing abridged accounts for a company qualifying as a ''micro entity'' is 1,558 Euros, equivalent to 10 h of a professional external accountant and added internal work equivalent to a 30% cost. If these accounts are provided as a by-product of the standard service package, this seems a gross overestimation except for the few small companies with exceedingly complex corporate structures. 13 Moreover, use of the ''extensible business reporting language'' (XBRL) filing format, now permitted, for instance, by the USA's Securities and Exchange Commission, holds the promise of further cost reductions (see, e.g., Hannon and Gold 2005) . 14 The limited formal control that the register can perform may even be counterproductive. For example, some registers consistently check that the figures in the accounts add up, and reject them if otherwise. However, unbalanced accounts are probably more informative to users when they are trying to ascertain any unreliability in the filing firm. 15 ''It is highly probable that SMEs would have to face more individual questions from public authorities, bankers and other stakeholders and consequently several requirements and formats will replace the former ones and therefore they will incur additional costs'' (ECCBSO 2007: 4) . Sect. 5.3, the strength of entrenched local private interests makes it unlikely that political bodies at the national level would enact a rule of mandatory disclosure even if such a rule were efficient.
Distortion of competition
Publication of accounts might also cause private costs to the disclosing firm by informing its competitors, which might also distort competition. However, this effect seems unlikely to be substantial when small companies are involved. 16 At least, these costs are clearly smaller than those of the disclosure now commonly required from public companies. A useful comparison would be that between the impact of publicly filing the annual accounts with that of announcing, for instance, the cancellation of a research programme. Doubt remains on this point, however, not for the micro companies considered by the European Commission but for medium-sized or even large private companies, for which disclosure may be quite sensitive, given their size and presence in concentrated and differentiated markets.
The lesser competitive effects for smaller firms are confirmed by the results of a survey conducted in October 2007 among Spanish users of a business information system, the codebook and results of which are shown in Table 1 (question 5). The survey was conducted by a major provider of online credit information for small firms in a large EU country. It was conducted online on October 25-26, 2007 by sending 74,862 emails to a random sample of registered users, offering each of them a free credit report (market price 13.92 €) if they answered the survey. A total of 5,924 users filled in the survey in 24 h, with a response rate of 7.91%. Most of the respondents were small firms (Table 2) .
According to the survey, the percentage of firms which use the service to find out about competitors, given by the third answer, decreases significantly with the size of the user firm, as suggested by the differences in average use between groups of firms of different size (Table 1 ). This is confirmed by the positive coefficient obtained for the Firm Size variable in the econometric estimation in which the dependent variable is Competitors, a binary variable equal to one when the firm uses the service to gain information on competitors, zero otherwise (model [1] in Table 3 ).
Nor does the fact that outlets in vertically integrated networks would be subject to different reporting requirements seem to create a significant cost difference. Franchised outlets publish their accounts when they are incorporated as companies, while vertically integrated outlets do not need to do so when they are mere divisions of the franchising firm. 17 The potential difference in disclosure costs seems a trifle 16 For a similar reason, the lack of separation of ownership and control in private companies avoids another source of costs: suboptimal decisions by managers. For public companies, surveys find that most managers of public companies are willing to sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings (Graham et al. 2005) . See, however, Arya et al. (2003) , who argue that managed earnings may be good for shareholders. 17 The difference has been pointed out by Barry (2006: 20) . Arruñada et al. (2008) make use of public information to observe substantial differences in performance between these vertical structures. Eur J Law Econ when considering that different rules apply to both types of vertical structures in matters such as resale price maintenance, collective bargaining or corporate tax rates.
Privacy cost
Damage to privacy, considered as a highly significant cost by some authors (e.g., Barry 2006) , is elusive and difficult to evaluate. The fact that most positive law does not grant privacy rights to corporations could be interpreted as an implicit social judgement whereby, overall, such privacy costs are not social costs. Two reasons may help in explaining why. First, a substantial part of the demand for company privacy is directed at tax evasion and fraud and therefore has little merit from a social perspective. Second, and closer to our case, it is doubtful that companies should be held to a lower standard of publicity than individuals. For individuals, most modern legal systems now protect privacy on financial matters but require publicity of the most important assets and liabilities: property rights on real estate, valuable movable goods, such as automobiles, and even some financial assets, as with holdings in public companies. Notice that publicity on real property often Notes The survey was conducted online on October 25-26 by sending 74,862 emails to a random selection of registered users, offering each of them a free credit report (market price 13.92 €) if they answered the survey. A total of 5,924 users filled in the survey in 24 h, with a response rate of 7.91% Eur J Law Econ Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the econometric analysis Eur J Law Econ refers not only to ownership rights but also to mortgages. 18 The consequence is that the most valuable assets in the ''balance sheets'' of individuals are made public. In this context, exempting legal persons from publicity would allow them to hide property by means of legal entities incorporated for the sole purpose of holding property, a practice that is already widespread in the EU for hiding cross-border real estate purchases from the tax authorities.
Mapping appropriable benefits
Publication of company accounts also provides benefits to the companies involved, to their trading partners and to third parties. This section examines those which are appropriable by the disclosing company. The user consults the service to obtain information on:
Advantages that the user firm obtains from having access to the information: 
Benefits for disclosers and their partners
Benefits for disclosing companies and their trading partners arise from reducing the information asymmetry between them: publishing the accounts grants access to potential and current trading partners to the historical record, current financial position and profitability of the disclosing firm. This reduction in information asymmetry is most valuable in transactions that embody future obligations for the firm: clients purchasing durable goods, all parties investing in firm-specific assets, minority shareholders and, especially, trade and financial creditors. Understandably, more transparent firms have been found to incur lower costs of debt and equity capital.
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Furthermore, publishing the accounts may be more credible and less costly than communicating them individually to contractual parties or handing them only to those parties who request them explicitly. Credibility is gained because filing the accounts with an independent third party (the registry) commits the firm, as accounts already filed cannot be modified and future accounts will have to be consistent with those filed in the past. This commitment provides value to the historical dimension of published accounts, which often is too summarily dismissed (e.g., Commission of the European Communities 2009b: 17), disregarding the value granted to historical data in positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . Costs are also reduced because it is no longer necessary to deliver them to a high number of trade creditors, and prospective creditors or third parties will no longer have to ask for the accounts to be delivered to them. Let us examine this second aspect in some depth.
3.2 Individual disclosure as an alternative to public disclosure The alternative solution proposed by the European Commission is for the creditor to ask for the borrowers' financial statements. This solution is problematic, not least because there are often more than two parties to the transaction.
Information provided to a party in a one-to-one interaction is often less credible than that provided to all potential parties by filing it in a public registry. Some evidence on this is given by the common practice in banking of, as a first step, checking loan applications (which often include specifically adapted financial statements) against reports prepared by business information agencies. 20 One may assume that if some credit applicants make up their accounts when dealing with 19 As modelled, among many others, by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and shown empirically, e.g., by Francis et al. (2005) , using firm-level data, and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) , using country-level data, as well as Hail (2002) and Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) . Good quality in financial reporting has been associated with lower price declines in financial crises, according to Mitton (2002) , in the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, and to Barton and Waymire (2004) , in the 1920s. See, however, Leftwich (2004) . It has also been observed that companies enjoy lower cost of credit after selling shares for the first time to the public, with the disclosure that this implies (Pagano et al. 1998) . Similarly, bond yields are lower in USA states that have mandated GAAP disclosure, especially among organisations with relatively higher information asymmetry (Gore 2004) . 20 For information on this and other practices mentioned in different sections of the paper, see, on checking creditworthiness, http://www.payontime.co.uk/collect/collect_creditworthy.html; about understanding banks, they are even more likely to do so when dealing with suppliers, given that suppliers are not experts in credit evaluation, do not have such ready access to additional information and are less likely to be a party in future transactions.
In addition, asking contractual parties for sensitive information is not always a sensible negotiating strategy, because it may destroy trust, which might be needed to adapt the transaction in the future. It may force the transaction to be more formal and legalistic. This seems especially important when making credit decisions as byproducts of commercial transactions, many of which need future adaptation. On the other hand, explicit contracting for safeguards is relatively more common and accepted for credit than for commercial transactions, and fewer adaptations are needed.
Evidence on commercial practice supports the claim that asking parties directly is not sensible. Suppliers often obtain sensitive information from their banks and from other firms, instead of directly from their clients. They thus avoid offending the client and probably gain more reliable information. Prevalence of this practice is confirmed by the responses given in the survey to question 8 (Table 1) : 47.16% of respondents rely on their banks and 41.83% on references from other firms to find out about the solvency of their clients and commercial partners (with 68.30% relying on banks or other firms and 21.07% on both).
Furthermore, the European Commission assumes that only two parties intervene in the credit transaction. However, as the previous example illustrates, it is often the case than there are more than two parties to the transaction, and the third party-the bank in the example-is not in a position to ask the prospective borrower for information. Instead, the bank will first check its own records if the prospective borrower is a bank client, and will always examine the external databases for information on the borrower's financial, judicial and tax status. If the buyer is not a bank client, the only independent information comes from such external databases. Asking the borrower's bank is out of the question in a competitive banking environment because of the twin risks of being misled or losing the transaction.
A similar situation arises when a bank lends against receivables. In many cases, the bank will not be willing to discount notes receivable from a client without first evaluating the creditworthiness of the maker or drawee (often the bank client's client). If the drawee is not a client of the bank, the bank can hardly request this party's accounts, and the bank will decide based on the information available from external sources, mainly credit agencies. The availability of information allows the bank to identify that the drawee is a good risk and on this basis the bank lends to its own-by assumption, less solvent-client. (To benefit more directly from his creditworthiness, the good risk purchaser can enter into a ''confirming'' agreement with his banks by which the bank will pay suppliers before their debts are due).
Lastly, even more serious difficulties arise when contracting for factoring, invoice discounting or credit insurance agreements, because the factor or the insurer need information on multiple firms: usually all their client's customers. Both
Footnote 20 continued credit rating, http://www.payontime.co.uk/collect/collect_understand_ratings.html; and about reducing risk, http://payontime.co.uk/collect/collect_riskreduce.html (visited October 5, 2007) .
Eur J Law Econ factoring and credit insurance are only producible on the basis of previous screening of borrowers, using databases compiled or produced by insurers who carefully examine both potential insured clients and borrowers.
Small companies do benefit from publishing their accounts
The European Commission bases its proposal on the belief that there is little demand for the financial statements of micro entities and small companies.
21 But this belief is proved wrong by examining the actual demand for the accounts of micro and small companies filed in public registries. For primary demand, Table 4 in the Annex summarises the size distribution of companies whose accounts were requested by final users at the Spanish Company Registry: 95.43% of the total requests are for accounts of micro entities and small companies, the two main potentially exempted categories (42.90 and 52.52%, respectively). For secondary demand, Table 5 summarises the SABI database, commercialised by Bureau va Dijk, which purchases its data on Spanish companies from Informa D&B S.A., which in turn purchases the raw data from the Spanish Company Registry. Of all companies in this database, 96.05% are micro entities or small (48.81 and 47.25%, respectively). Moreover, the size distribution of companies in this database approximates reasonably well the size distribution of demand for three reasons. First, Informa and Bureau va Dijk are commercial operators, and are therefore unlikely to pay for and store useless data. Furthermore, over 2006-2007, final users requested information on 99.6% of small private companies included in the databases of the three main credit information agencies operating in the Spanish market, according to its trade association (ASEDIE 2007: 4) . Lastly, the SABI database also approximates final demand because of the way in which credit information agencies have built up these databases over time. Every year, they purchase from the Registry data on companies on which they have reported in previous years and process it. With every final user request for accounts not yet in the database, the agencies purchase such accounts but also update their annual demand for the future-therefore, they also update the composition of the database. In this case, after 15 years of updating, the database offers a picture of demand which is sufficiently accurate for our purposes. Certainly, information is requested by final users on some companies more than on others, but this bias is not only related to size but also to other factors, such as payment delays and insolvency. 22 21 In particular, the Commission states that ''there is a lack of broad demand'' for accounts of microentities, (2007: 8) and that those of small companies ''are used by a limited number of stakeholders, such as credit institutions and suppliers that have the possibility to require financial information from the company' ' (2007: 17) . Its later impact assessment repeats the mistake (2009b: 16-18). 22 The demand for information on small companies can also be inferred from the massive nature of the demand for this type of information. In the first 9 months of 2007, information on 1,933,220 different firms-as identified by their tax ID numbers-was requested at least once from one database in one EU country. Considering the size distribution of firms in the economy, it is clear that the bulk of this demand consists of information on micro and small firms. Such massive demand is also in line with the communication strategies that these agencies are following: e.g., an online provider specialising in small firms has recently run advertising campaigns at prime time on main national radio networks. In fact, it is likely that small firms benefit more from massive credit information systems based on mandatory disclosure than, at least, large and even medium-sized firms.
23 This is because the size of large firms makes it sensible for financial analysts and even the press to spend resources monitoring them and reporting on them. Also, large firms deal with large numbers of contractual parties, and these act as powerful information networks. Small firms, by contrast, are unknown outside their own small circle. Credit information systems make it possible to use the reputational capital developed in this small circle when interacting with strangers. They therefore make possible the sort of anonymous trade that is often considered essential for economic growth. 24 Our survey of users of the leading business information service in Spain is consistent with the claim that small firms benefit the most from the publication of accounts (Table 1 , question 1). First, a vast majority of firms (88.77%) use the system to know about micro and small companies, as defined by the European Commission. Only 11.23% use it for obtaining information on larger companies. Second, accounts are by far the most valuable piece of information they obtain (83.69% of users valued them), followed afar by judicial incidents (54.95%) and corporate information (31.35%). Ready access to the accounts of small companies is therefore the key value added by this service.
The econometric analysis confirms these results. When regressing a binary variable representing a Large firms answer to the first question of the survey, which asks respondents if they usually consult the system to get information on large or small firms, the estimated coefficient for the Firm Size variable is significantly positive (model [2] in Table 3 ). This means that larger user firms are more likely to obtain information on large firms. Furthermore, a similar result obtains when firm size is measured in terms of the discreet categories proposed by the European Commission.
The Commission's disregard for the demand for financial information and its value is understandable because the benefits of publishing the accounts have increased dramatically in recent years, thanks to recent changes in information technologies. First, the development of scanners and OCR (optical character recognition) software made it possible to introduce the accounts in computerised databases. More recently, the Internet has granted universal access to such databases at low cost. The novelty of these changes makes it likely that many of the potential benefits have not yet been fully realised, as is the case with information technologies more generally.
The Commission's disregard might also be explained by the focus of academic research on public companies. It is surely true that small firms would not benefit from the type of disclosure now required from public companies, which has been adapted to reduce information asymmetry in equity transactions (both in new sales of securities and between managers and shareholders in companies with dispersed ownership) and therefore requires more sophisticated and higher-quality information. However, there is demand for lower quality information on small private companies. Two pieces of evidence support this claim. First, the market demands lower quality financial reporting from private than from public companies (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) . Second, when statistical methods are applied for assessing credit risk, the risk of smaller and private companies is estimated using statistical and discriminant methods, such as the one pioneered by Altman (1968) . However, the risk of public companies is more often estimated with structural and reduced-form models that rely on market prices of the debtor's securities, particularly the Merton 1974 model (De Servigny and Renault 2004: 63-116) . In short, information provided by filing small private companies' accounts is of low quality, but useful and in demand.
Mapping externalities
Every time a company publishes its accounts, it benefits third parties in ways that could hardly compensate the disclosing company in any practical way. Aggregated information on small individual firms, even if their size is well below the thresholds in the European Commission's proposal, is valuable for credit information agencies, to improve the accuracy and predictive power of their credit rating models; for analysts and investors, as it allows them to do comparative analysis when allocating capital among firms and industries; for competitors and competitors' investors, when analysing the industry; for regulators and policymakers, when making decisions; for central banks, when evaluating the level of indebtness of the economy and the soundness of banks; and even for researchers doing empirical work. In addition, one may expect these effects to also indirectly benefit other economic agents, both at the micro and macroeconomic levels. This is the case, in particular, with credit information, bank regulation and national accounting.
The importance of these externalities for credit markets makes it advisable to use credit variables in defining account publication rules. In particular, when drawing up differential mandatory rules, the thresholds and conditions defining which firms should make their accounts public should include a measure of firms' credit volume rather than only generic size variables, such as the ones used by the European Commission to define the thresholds in its proposal (assets, sales and employment), which are not directly related to credit.
Externalities in credit information
Financial information agencies produce reports containing all sorts of information that is of use for evaluating companies' creditworthiness. These reports, which may be customised depending on the needs of the client, often include several years of accounts as filed at the Company Registry and the identity of the companies' shareholders and legal representatives. In addition, not only for companies but also for individual firms, reports might also include, if available, negative information about previous defaults, as filed by trade and financial creditors and courts, as well as contact information and news clips on the firm. As a summary, they may also offer a credit rating or even an estimated probability of default. 25 The accounts filed with the Company Registry are a major component of these credit reports, because of the problems plaguing alternative sources of information. Exclusive reliance on negative information about credit defaults worsens the quality of credit assessment, and financial institutions are often unwilling to share positive information on debtors (Powell et al. 2004 ). Furthermore, even sharing arrangements depend on the cooperation of established financial institutions, which poses serious risks to competition. 
Information externalities
Voluntary publication of accounts endangers the key services provided by these agencies. If a substantial number of companies were to stop publishing their accounts, this would not only reduce the coverage of services for such companies, but would also impoverish information at the industry level and, more important, would worsen the assessment of credit risk for all companies in the economy. Let us see why.
Obviously, reports on private companies that would stop filing their accounts would hardly contain any financial information. Their credit risk would therefore be badly estimated. However, these effects would be trivial to the extent that they would be limited to the firm which would also be receiving the savings from not filing.
This full ''internalisation'' of damages would not occur in the two other effects, for which the non-publisher would still benefit from having other firms publishing the accounts. With less publication, all sorts of aggregate information about sectors of economic activity, as well as the firms in a state, region or town, would be less reliable. In addition, and worst of all, the ability to assess the credit risk of the firms that still publish their accounts would suffer because such assessment would be based on a smaller and possibly biased sample. Smaller, because some companies would not publish their accounts and biased, because the companies that decide not to publish them may share certain characteristics, making it more or less likely for them to publish. For instance, worse risks might be less inclined to publish. Firms not publishing their accounts would therefore be free riding on those publishing them. This would include even those with no debt if exempted from complying with the rule of mandatory publication.
In a context of costly publishing, this free riding opens the door to the possibility that fewer and fewer firms will continue publishing, and the information produced will become increasingly less valuable, triggering a vicious circle. We can glimpse its effects from a similar and better-known case: reliance on negative information by 25 See two descriptions of the services offered by two leading firms in Spain at http://www. informa.es/infornet/Main/idioma/01/idioma/01/screen/SShowPage/pagina/infoeconomica.html and http:// www.iberinform.es/Servicios/InfEstandarIber?.htm (visited October 2, 2007) . 26 See, e.g., in the case of Spain, TDC (2005) . credit bureaus. Even for a company filing its accounts, less comprehensive filing of accounts by other companies will probably bring similar consequences to those of constraining the use of positive information by credit bureaus specialising in consumer credit. With less information on file, the accuracy of their credit risk scoring models decreases. Consequently, credit becomes more costly and less available, banks face more difficulties for monitoring indebtedness and established creditors enjoy new barriers to entry, as shown by Barron and Staten (2003) .
Competition externalities
Public availability of financial accounts improves the flow of credit-risk information, allowing suppliers and other potential creditors to evaluate credit risk by themselves without previous interaction with or personal knowledge of the potential debtor, and without resorting to intermediaries (mostly banks) who may hold such knowledge. It is understood that the more precise pricing of risk makes more transactions possible and improves the allocation of resources.
Furthermore, lesser asymmetry of information expands the type and number of potential lenders and risk bearers, which otherwise would be limited to the banks and suppliers which had contracted with the debtor firm in the past and developed personal knowledge about its creditworthiness.
27
Such expansion takes place in several markets and dimensions, with substantial competitive effects. New transactions are made possible, including second party lending by suppliers-trade credit without discounting, which amounts to disintermediating the banks-and third-party lending and risk partitioning. New participants can enter local, regional and national markets, from credit rating agencies to banks, factoring firms and credit insurers without branches in those markets. 28 Many of these new participants are thus able to operate across borders, as foreign suppliers, lenders, informers and insurers can now rely more on objective, impersonal information. Within the financial industry, small banks become more capable of competing with large banks. Lastly, small firms in all markets are slightly more capable of competing with large firms, because they now have better access to the credit rating services which previously were less available to them than to large firms. The latter were anyway in a position to develop their own services for assessing credit risk.
Our survey of Spanish users of the main business information system is consistent with these claims (Table 1 , questions 2, 7, 5 and 6), as they declare they use its services for granting credit to new clients (60.42% of users) and closing sales that otherwise would not be carried out (45.97%). Furthermore, more respondents use the information for new relationships of special significance (47.99%) and all new relationships (37.02%) than to monitor old relationships, whatever their importance. Its role in sales and credit decisions is also clear from the high proportion of users relying on it for getting information on clients (85.96%) and for deciding about sales on credit (66.95%). The resulting pattern of uses supports our claim that access to company accounts-the information that respondents value the most-expands trade opportunities and eases entry into new markets. Furthermore, econometric analysis finds that it is smaller firms that are most likely to use the information to grant credit to new clients (model [3] in Table 3 ).
Externalities in banking regulation
Financial institutions increasingly rely on external measures of credit risk to assess the value and riskiness of their loan portfolios, partly as a consequence of the Basel II guidelines which require a radical restructuring of how they assess credit risk, allowing them to use external credit assessments. 29 Credit information systems are key for applying these Basel II approaches in that they help to analyse if credit provisioning is adequate, to assess capital requirements and to evaluate concentration and related lending. They thus contribute to our understanding of portfolio credit risks of both individual financial institutions and whole financial systems (Powell et al. 2004) .
Credit rating agencies have even developed risk assessment systems that automatically assess risk for small private companies. For instance, Moody's ''RiskCalc'' models estimate 1-year and 5-year probabilities of default for European private companies relying on their financial statements. By providing a ready measure of private company credit risk, these systems allow better-informed credit decisions. 30 More important, being automatic, they make it possible to evaluate, monitor and adjust the risk of lenders' portfolios in a matter of minutes. Experts can then focus on the high-risk loans that the model has identified as such. Trade and regulation are also made easier by having a single measure of risk (Kocagil et al. 2003; Moody's KPV 2007) .
Since 2003, Moody's has adapted such models to the particular characteristics of the following European markets: Germany, Spain, France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The datasets used to build these RiskCalc models are from companies smaller than the thresholds finally proposed by the European Commission: e.g., the model for Nordic Europe includes companies with more than €0.1 m in total assets; for the UK, those with more than £0.1 m in total assets; for most other EU countries, those with turnover greater than €0.5 m.
Furthermore, despite being well below the European Commission's thresholds for micro entities, RiskCalc thresholds are relatively high when considering that 29 ''The Committee permits banks a choice between two broad methodologies for calculating their capital requirements for credit risk. One alternative, the Standardised Approach, will be to measure credit risk in a standardised manner, supported by external credit assessments… In determining the risk weights in the standardised approach, banks may use assessments by external credit assessment institutions recognised as eligible for capital purposes by national supervisors'' (BIS 2006: 19) . 30 Not only for deciding on loan applications but also for establishing more precise risk premiums and even establishing market transfer prices for loans made by parent companies to their subsidiaries. many banks apply them to firms of all sizes. RiskCalc models omit micro companies because, in order to use the models as stand-alone tools, they rely fully on quantitative data. However, the credit rating systems developed and applied internally by banks typically make use of both qualitative and quantitative data, so that for micro companies they can balance the lower accuracy of their quantitative data by giving more weight to qualitative data (on, e.g., management quality or succession plans). Apparently, banks find it informative to complement such qualitative data with quantitative data, mainly the published accounts of even the smallest companies.
Considering this extensive use of micro and small private companies' accounts, a reduction in the number of firms filing them would make estimating credit risk substantially more difficult because defaults are rare, a fact that already calls for using data from the last few years when estimating default probabilities. In particular, to the extent that smaller firms would cease filing reports, the thresholds for the models relying purely on quantitative data would be raised, and their coverage would consequently be reduced. The size of the EU and USA RiskCalc datasets gives us a glimpse of the likely change. As a consequence of the EU rule of mandatory publication of accounts by private and not only public companies, the European adaptations of the model rely on the accounts of many more companies than in the USA. Whereas, for example, the French model is based on 297,000 firms and the Spanish model is based on 140,790 firms, the USA model is based on only 40,000 firms.
Considering that most of large banks' risk-about 50-60%-is credit risk, with market and operational risks taking the remainder (Kuritzkes et al. 2003) , reducing the set of information has serious consequences for assessing banks' risk. It is therefore understandable that the European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Data Offices should have reacted strongly against the EC's proposal, considering that, in this new regulatory context, ''the availability of an accounting and reporting framework that meets the requirements of banks is a cornerstone of a successful implementation of the new European prudential framework'' (ECCBSO 2007: 2). 
Externalities in national accounting
When building the financial accounts of national economies, many central banks rely partly on the financial statements of non-financial firms, mainly to produce information on their financial operations. Some countries have developed specific databases of accounts, to which firms send their accounts voluntarily, getting in return privileged access to aggregate information on their industry and the economy.
But participation tends to be low and suffers from several biases-e.g., large firms are more inclined to participate. This makes it necessary to complement the analysis of their own databases with the accounts of small companies. For instance, 31 The ECCBSO was set up in November 1987 on the initiative of several European central banks and the European Commission to ''to improve the analysis of company data through the exchange of information, comparison of analytical methods and joint studies. It is composed of institutions from twelve European Union Member States and European Commission and OECD'' (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ indicators/bachdatabase_en.htm, visited on October 14, 2007).
the Bank of Spain's database, which contained only 8,923 accounts in 2004, used for this purpose the accounts of 441,859 small companies filed at the Companies' Registry (Banco de España 2006: 190) . Without mandatory disclosure, it is doubtful how many of these accounts would be available.
Who should balance costs and benefits?
We have seen in previous sections that deciding on the publication of accountsboth whether to publish them or not and which contents to publish-entails costs and benefits. We will consider in this section alternative ways of trading off such costs and benefits: decisions by individual companies, both independently and through private collective arrangements, and government intervention to mandate publication and standardise the information to be published.
Do firms balance costs and benefits well?
Voluntary decisions by rational decision makers may deviate from the optimal trade-off of costs and benefits for two main reasons: the asymmetric structure of the information available and the presence of externalities. In addition, this balancing of costs and benefits may also be hindered when the decision maker deviates from rationality.
Information asymmetry constraints
In situations of information asymmetry, parties who are better informed may tend to voluntarily disclose their information to uninformed parties to avoid their inferring the worst and reacting accordingly, withdrawing their cooperation or taking precautionary measures (Grossman 1981; Grossman and Hart 1980; Milgrom 1981) . Some evidence on the presence of incentives for voluntary disclosure by private firms is provided, 32 for instance, by the common practice of credit rating agencies, of using as an indicator of creditworthiness the fact that a company keeps all sorts of registrations up to date: from its listing in the telephone directory to its file in the company register.
But informed parties may not disclose the information when one of the following assumptions does not hold: (1) When disclosure is costly, the possibility that uninformed trading parties will infer the worst from nondisclosure does not necessarily provide enough incentives to disclose (Jovanovic 1982; Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1986 ). (2) For the same reason, a similar outcome arises when it is not publicly known if the supposedly well informed party is in fact well informed or not (Matthews and Postlewaite 1985; Farrell 1986; Shavell 1994) . (3) When not all uninformed parties understand the information, their lack of understanding may limit the benefits of disclosure for good firms and firms may end up in a nondisclosure equilibrium (Grossman 1981; Fishman and Hagerty 2003) . (4) When the informed party cannot disclose all information (for instance, because it would have to prepare several sets of financial statements using different principles, which would be prohibitively expensive), a rule constraining disclosure choice will increase the value of the disclosed information (Fishman and Hagerty 1990) .
For disclosure of financial statements by private small companies, three of these assumptions do not hold, hindering voluntary disclosure. First, disclosure is costly, which may deter voluntary disclosure and cause confusion in the signal sent by nondisclosure. Second, it is public knowledge that companies have financial statements, which they use for their own management, so the second assumption does not hold. Third, some market participants do not fully understand the accounts. Fourth, mandatory accounting principles are needed to increase the value of the information by limiting discretion.
Our survey of users of the main business information service in Spain supports the claim that the signal sent to potential trading partners by not filing is ambiguous (Table 1) . Of all respondents, 57.43% consider it a bad sign if a company has not filed its accounts. However, 41.58% do not conclude anything because they agree there may be many reasons for not publishing the accounts. Consequently, they simply try to gain additional information. Certainly, a majority of respondents considered failure to file as a bad signal.
33 However, our respondents are a subsample of the population of economic agents using these information systems. Moreover, they are judging the failure to file in an environment of mandatory filing, in which failure to file is not prevalent among active companies (informal estimates run from 10 to 20%). One could assume that their judgement would be more lenient under voluntary filing, mirroring greater ambiguity of failing to file. The consequence would be fewer incentives to file.
Difficulties for internalising externalities
The most important reason for suboptimal disclosure is the presence of externalities: firms lack incentives to voluntarily disclose the optimal amount of information, given that they internalise some but not all the social benefits of disclosure. 34 Furthermore, the use of computers and the Internet has increased the value of these 33 Unreported regression analysis shows that larger firms are more benign when interpreting failure to file the accounts, whereas older firms and those which file their accounts earlier in the year tend to give a worse rating to firms which have failed to file theirs. 34 This goes even for authors that are generally sceptical about the overall merits of financial regulation. For example, Zingales considers that ''we can identify three areas where intervention is needed. First, in the area of disclosure: companies tend to have too little incentive to disclose '' (2004: 40) . Some other rationales for mandatory disclosure, such as protecting small investors or increasing confidence in capital markets, enjoy less unanimous support in the literature. Compare, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991: 296-300) with the studies cited in n. 6. We skip discussion of these studies here because they do not apply to private small companies, which do not sell securities in the market and, given their small size, the reputational effect of their eventual failure or fraudulent behaviour would in any case be very limited.
externalities by making it possible to aggregate the information in the accounts and to distribute the information to millions of users more cheaply and promptly.
However, the presence of externalities does not necessarily require a public solution. In the spirit of Coase (1960) , we need to examine the comparative performance of mandatory disclosure as compared to voluntary disclosure under alternative solutions, such as private sector collective agreements that may internalise externalities in unorganised voluntary disclosure and offer the potential advantage of being more adaptive.
In particular, information intermediaries can be developed by firms and industry associations to process firms' information, allowing externalities to be obtained but minimising the costs for the firms themselves. Such intermediaries can produce aggregate indicators for the industry or even partial indicators for individual firms without disclosing sensitive information: for instance, they can rate firms' solvency without disclosing detailed information, as done by the ''RiskCalc'' system in the USA, as explained in Sect. 4.2.
These private arrangements are less viable, however, for private than for public companies. Their operation depends for their success on firms' cooperation and it is likely that a greater number of firms will make it more difficult for them to agree and enforce their agreements on sharing information. For smaller firms, such information intermediaries either fail to exist or tend to provide incomplete and inaccurate information for a lower number of firms, as illustrated by experiences such as that of RiskCalc in the USA (Sect. 4.2) or the Bank of Spain (Sect. 4.3).
In particular, voluntary arrangements suffer a serious self-selection bias if firms in distress are more likely not to cooperate.
35 This is potentially damaging because statistical models for assessing credit risk rely on a relatively small number of defaults. And this is not the only bias in the willingness to provide information. For example, financial institutions are often willing to build private databases with negative information on payment but they are less willing to share positive information, probably because they do not want to risk losing their good clients. However, including positive information significantly improves the estimation of credit risk, leading to access to credit for more borrowers when positive information is included (Powell et al. 2004) .
Considering these factors, it seems that voluntary disclosure might work better for private large companies than for private small companies, because both the costs of disclosure may be larger and the benefits easier to reach by voluntary disclosure for large private firms than for small private firms. Many large private firms produce differentiated products and are active in concentrated markets, so disclosure is more likely to damage their competitive position. Also, with a small number of firms it is easier to overcome collective action problems and reach industry-wide externalities by agreeing to voluntary disclosure. On the contrary, small firms are more often in competition. And there are often huge numbers of them in any industry, making such voluntary agreements much more difficult to reach and enforce.
Deviations from rationality
So far, we have been assuming that companies are able to rationally evaluate the costs and benefits of publishing their accounts. Let us now consider some possible deviations from rationality.
First, companies are not individuals. Therefore, rational calculation by managers may lead to irrational decisions by their firms if managers' interests are misaligned with those of shareholders in maximising the value of the firm. This is a serious problem for companies with separation of ownership and control. In fact, many discussions on mandatory disclosure focus on the conflict between managers and shareholders, and try to elucidate how mandatory regulation may affect their ability to contract for optimal disclosure. It is a minor problem, however, for small private companies, given that for them we can confidently assume little separation between ownership and control.
Second, we could argue that manager-owners of private small companies are not always capable of correctly weighing the costs and benefits of publishing their accounts. There is no doubt that many of them often fail in this (and many other) calculations. Cognitive research has discovered many systematic biases in decisionmaking. For instance, in this area, one could easily imagine the possible presence of ''status quo bias'' hindering adaptation to the fact that the Internet has made credit information easier to aggregate and circulate, therefore enhancing benefits. Also, especially for micro companies wishing to file, an external mandatory rule can save them a cost in terms of exerting self-control. Nonetheless, whatever the importance of these biases, it is unclear what role should be taken by the government in easing them, mainly because decision makers in government also suffer similar biases and private decision makers often have better incentives for learning how to overcome them. 36 Third, individuals may be perfectly rational in evaluating costs and benefits but may be pressured by maladapted social norms to behave in accordance with the norm. This may happen, for instance, if the norm imposes additional costs (e.g., a reputational loss) on those who do not comply with it.
37 Bainbridge (2000) argues that a social norm of suboptimal disclosure-rooted in herding and conformity behaviour-may define a bad collective equilibrium of low voluntary disclosure in a financial market. In such situations, a rule of mandatory disclosure could take society to a hopefully more efficient equilibrium.
The argument is important because the financial markets of many member states, especially the new member states of the EU, are emerging markets with closely-knit 36 Moreover, cognitive arguments open the door to explanations in all directions. For instance, Arya and Mittendorf explain, on the basis of herding behaviour amongst third-party information providers, why voluntary disclosure may benefit the discloser even though the information directly benefits competitors, by guiding the information gathering and dissemination amongst these third parties. ''Roughly stated, the infusion of early precise information can have a domino effect on followers, leading to a consensus view that does a poor job of reflecting the diversity of information '' (2005: 232) . 37 The aversion to disclosure in Chinese business circles was weighted when exempting small companies from publication in Hong Kong (SCCLR 2000: 195) . business communities in which privacy is still a predominant social norm.
38 Under the pressure of this social norm, it is less likely that mandatory disclosure would be promulgated by the state, if given the freedom to decide. Furthermore, it is also less likely that companies would voluntarily disclose optimally. 39 5.2 Do governments balance costs and benefits better than firms?
Firms' inability to produce externalities, especially when these are as substantial as those existing today regarding credit information, makes a mandatory rule of account publication potentially efficient. But this efficiency hinges on the actual ability of government to both minimise costs and maximise benefits. Mandatory publication would not be efficient if the costs of filing the accounts are disproportionate nor the system is structured in a way that does not ensure reliability or does not allow utilisation of the information in the public files.
Company registries are the key agencies responsible for this efficiency, as they are the recipients, holders and primary issuers of account information. Even company registers which are less active in checking the legality of corporate transactions need to be reliable with respect to the date of filing and the storage of the accounts. To avoid potential damages to their parties, registries' independence is preserved by granting them a monopoly position, so that companies cannot choose a ''register of convenience'' (Arruñada 2003) . Understandably, this monopoly position often makes it harder to reduce the cost of filing the accounts and enhance the value of the information. 40 The key element is the efficient functioning of electronic systems for filing and retrieving information, not only on an individual basis but also in batches, thus allowing the operation of filing and information intermediaries who compete in developing well-adapted interfaces with users. Because there is a substantial fixed component in the cost of filing, in order to reduce the cost of filing for small firms they should be allowed to file through their accountants and other providers of tax, legal and administrative services, without any specific involvement of the companies' legal representatives. In addition, costs can be reduced by unifying the different accounts to be filed for different purposes, or at least establishing 38 The importance of this emerging-markets dimension of the problem is compounded in the light of the evidence provided by Djankov et al. (2007) who show that in less developed countries credit volume depends relatively more on the ex ante availability of information on debtors' quality than on the strength of creditors' rights. 39 Different social norms are in place within the EU in many areas, one such being payment periods and payment delays (Arruñada 1999a (Arruñada , b, 2000 , which have led to the issue of Directive 2000/35/EC to combat late payment in commercial transactions and achieve greater harmonisation in the internal market. 40 The need for a speedy register is clear when considering that cost and value are in conflict: more recent accounts are more informative for users but filing sooner is also costlier for filers. This trade-off is illustrated by the failure of the 2006 UK Companies Act to substantially reduce the filing period. The final wording of section 442 shortened it from 10 to 9 months for private companies. However, the White Paper for the UK's Company Law Reform Bill of 2005 had proposed to reduce filing times to 7 months because, according to small business organisations, the increase in costs ''would not adversely affect work patterns… [and] be of benefit to third-party small company users of those accounts'' (DTI 2005: 281) . standards that allow accounting software to produce different sets of accounts automatically for different purposes.
If government, which government? Cross-border effects of credit information services
Even though the Commission of the European Communities considers that ''harmonised accounting requirements are needed for cross-border investments and company operations also for many small companies' ' (2007: 15) , it does not make explicit its view on the cross-border effect of companies' publication of accounts. Given the Commission's proposal to exempt micro companies from mandatory publication of accounts, it seems, however, to implicitly assume that this exemption would not entail relevant cross-border effects. In particular, it seems to assume that effects on transparency for third parties are only relevant for the mobility of companies but not for the mobility of goods and services. Both assumptions are doubtful, as many micro and small private companies are involved in cross-border trade. According to the last row of Table 5 in the Annex, 4.65% of micro companies and 16.29% of small companies are involved in crossborder trade. These micro and small companies do benefit from the increased transparency provided by a harmonised policy regarding publication of accounts. As examined above, such benefit comes both directly, by offering access to the accounts, and indirectly, by facilitating greater development of information systems that assess and report on private companies' credit risk. It is also revealing that in our sample users of a Spanish business information system, we find that firms more involved in cross-border trade tend to use the information more to grant credit to both new and old clients, and to sell in new regions (models 3-5 in Table 3 ).
In essence, the beneficial effects of account publication on the cost of credit apply more to small firms in cross-border than in domestic transactions because for domestic transactions banking networks provide a palliative solution but for crossborder transactions there are no international banking networks at the retail level. Imagine a Swedish bank buying bills of exchange or entering into a factoring agreement with a Swedish client who is supplying a Portuguese customer on credit. For the bank and its client, information on the credit rating of the foreign partner is hard to obtain because Swedish banks have little retail activity in Portugal, if any. Information from the published accounts and from the reports provided by credit information agencies services that heavily rely on them is therefore more valuable for smaller than for larger companies.
This effect may seem irrelevant because the current volume of cross-border trade by micro firms is small. However, the important question is why it is small and how to reduce the barriers that keep it small. The discussion leading to the adoption of the Directive on payment delays throws some light on this, as exporters in Nordic countries complained persistently about how unreliable Southern European firms were in matters of both payments and delays (Arruñada 1999a (Arruñada , b, 2000 . In such a context, the availability of standardised information that allows good risks to distinguish themselves from bad risks is important for competition (and even for ascertaining the truth in potentially damaging stereotypes).
Certainly, this argument supports mandatory publication only to the extent that private incentives are insufficient, especially for cross-border trade by small firms, given its currently incipient level. These small foreign trade pioneers produce positive externalities for their competitors in the same industry, region and country. Therefore, their incentives to start are suboptimal, including their incentives to take the necessary steps, such as more open disclosure. Furthermore, for such pioneer firms the costs of disclosure might be substantial if disclosure damages their competitive position in the-initially more important-domestic market. A collective action trap may find firms in a bad equilibrium in which no firm is willing to pioneer because most profits would accrue to its competitors.
Moreover, Member States could try to avoid this trap by imposing mandatory publication at the national level. That is, in our example, the Portuguese Government would impose mandatory publication on Portuguese firms, so solving their collective action problem. Proximity to Portuguese firms might help in evaluating their costs and benefits but might also bias the political consideration of any costs and benefits. In the end, political decisions also depend on the relative strength of the different interests in place, whatever their merit from a public perspective. To the extent that mandatory publication would increase competition in the Portuguese market (by, for instance, facilitating credit for importers), it is easy to imagine that many agents might oppose it based on their private interests, even though it is socially beneficial. 41 In general terms, it is unclear which level of government-European or national-is better placed to reach market-enhancing decisions on this issue.
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In fact, decision rights on this issue are shared amongst European and national institutions in a way that, given their interests, probably allows them to make the best use of available specific information (Hayek 1945) . European decision makers, who are more interested than national ones in developing cross-border competitive markets, are probably well placed to pursue the benefits of this policy, whereas national decision makers may be more influenced by its costs. The current system allocates decision rights on benefits to Brussels regarding which accounts are published by whom, but decision rights on costs to national governments, which implement and manage the account filing systems whose performance determines the level of most costs.
Concluding remarks
The analysis of costs and benefits in this article advises caution about proposals on the scope of mandatory publication of private company accounts. In contrast, it indicates the advisability of policies that aim to reduce costs and enhance value 41 Easterbrook and Fischel admit that competition among USA states cannot produce optimal solutions in the presence of interstate effects (1991: 295, 300-2, 304-5): some states would tend to be holdouts to benefit their firms. 42 In addition, the presence of sunk costs may also motivate substantial rent-seeking activities. (Or, more precisely, ''quasi-rent-seeking'' activities). It might therefore be more wasteful to apply the subsidiarity principle in this area, whatever the decision taken by the European Union. through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems. In so doing, they would exploit the possibilities that new information technologies offer to use the accounts in assessing the credit risk of even micro firms, therefore reducing their cost of credit and expanding trade opportunities.
Publishing accounts does cause administrative costs, but these are not high and can be reduced further by electronic filing. Other costs, such as possible distortions in competition and the erosion of privacy are immaterial or doubtful, especially for micro and small companies. First, the cost to the disclosing firm of informing its competitors seems unlikely to be substantial when small companies are involved. Damage to privacy is elusive and hard to evaluate because most positive law does not grant privacy rights to corporations. Moreover, much of the demand for company privacy is directed at tax evasion and fraud, and therefore has little merit from a social perspective.
On the other hand, publishing accounts lessens information asymmetry with other firms. This effect has always been present but has become stronger due to credit information systems based on computerised databases and universal Internet access. Status reports based on these systems are thus reducing the cost of credit for small firms, enhancing competition in product and credit markets, and expanding trade and specialisation. Furthermore, small companies are the main beneficiaries of these credit information systems, as shown by two figures: about 95% of both their primary and secondary demand is for information on small companies; and in our survey 89% of final users declare they use such systems to find out about small firms.
Moreover, publishing company accounts produces substantial externalities, especially in credit assessment and financial regulation, because firms do not internalise all the benefits of publishing their accounts. Private arrangements are unlikely to reach an acceptable production of such externalities, especially for small firms and due to the collective action problem inherent in such a massive number of firms. Most of the externalities would therefore be lost in a regime of voluntary publication. Consequently, credit risk assessments would cover fewer firms and would be less accurate even for the firms that do publish their accounts, posing an acute free-riding problem.
Overall, it seems viable for governments to structure company registries to achieve a more efficient trade-off of costs and benefits than would be possible with a regime of voluntary publication.
In addition to throwing light on the policy discussion on the regulation of accounting disclosure by private companies, this article contributes to different strands of economics, accounting and finance. First, the article shows once again that deregulation policies that narrowly focus on reducing the cost of institutional arrangements may be counterproductive when they disregard the value of the services being provided. Second, by focusing on private companies, the article complements the literature on mandatory financial disclosure, which has mainly focused on the effects that financial disclosure by public companies exerts on equity transactions. Third, it also confirms that the main benefit of disclosure by private companies is to reduce information asymmetry in credit transactions. This suggests that the opportunities and regulatory problems involved are more of the type posed by credit bureaus than those of conventional corporate disclosure, which is more oriented to stock market transactions. Lastly, compared to the literature on mandatory financial disclosure by public companies, the article suffers from the lack of stock market prices, which makes it well nigh impossible to measure effects on firm value. The article, however, provides survey evidence that also confirms empirically such beneficial effects on credit transactions.
